The declassified British archives of the Prime Ministerial Office referring to Cyprus over the period 1980-1983 include references to subjects relating to the political developments in the island.
The American factor
British government records of the time frequently detail the position of the USA on the negotiations over the Cyprus problem and the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) of the so-called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ by Rauf Denktash on 15/11/83.
Two days after the UDI a State Department official informed British diplomats in Washington that the US administration would coninute to publicly call for a reversal of Denktash’s declaration, even though he admitted there were few chances he would be convinced to oblige. The view in the State Department was rather that there should be an examination of whether the declaration was presenting new negotiating possibilities.
The US feared that Congress, under the additional pressure of the Greek lobby, would demand all military assistance provided to Ankara to be cut off, unless “some visible progress was made in the next two months”. On 18//11/83 Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger told Foreign Office minister Lady Young that he hoped the British government could understand why the US administration “had to guard against voicing excessive criticism which might later be played back against them by the Congress.”
On 21/11/83 President Reagan assured President Kyprianou of the American support and had urged him “not to allow Denktash’s ill-advised action to preclude consideration of opportunities to make progress towards a peaceful settlement.” Like the British side, the Americans were supporting intercommunal talks as the way forward.
Missing persons
During 1982 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was the frequent recipier of representations by both Spyros Kyprianou and Rauf Denktash accusing each other over the problems that the Committee of Missing Persons (CMP) faced soon after its creation the previous year.
On 29/3/82 President Kyprianou was complaining in a letter about the “intransigence” demonstrated by the Turkish Cypriot side which had “rendered the CMP’s existence meaningless” despite the Greek Cypriots’ good will. Soon after, on 7/4/83 Rauf Denktash was protesting that the Cypriot government was using the missing persons issue for propaganda purposes. In an exhaustive letter he was detailing his view of the Cyprus problem and cited accounts of violence against Turkish Cypriots.
On 20/4/82 a Foreign Office official (private secretary Richards) summarised that “in part this [the absence of practical progress on the missing persons issue] is indeed due to what President Kyprianou describes as Turkish Cypriot intransigence. Nevertheless it is clear that Greek Cypriot side have less interest in dealing with the practical humanitarian problem than in exploiting it to the maximum for propaganda purposes.”
Security assessment
A December 1982 security assessment of Cyprus highlighted as factors that could affect government stability over the following few years “a possible confrontation between Turkish/Turkish Cypriot and Greek/Greek Cypriot armed forces” on the island, “public dissatisfaction from either a failure to show progress towards a settlement or from any readiness on the part of the government to ‘sell out’ Greek Cypriot interests to achieve one”, the possibility of “strife between the Greek Cypriot Right and Left” and the “distrust between President Kyprianou and the Greek government”.
A main concern for the British was the fact that “it was not easy for Kyprianou to break with the communists”, as AKEL was supporting the president’s party in Parliament.
A special section of the security report was dedicated to staff of diplomatic missions of communist countries in Cyprus that were proven or suspected intelligence officers. In the Soviet embassy of about 50 members of staff, eight were identified and six suspected intelligence officers.